Most of today’s circumvention use the same fundamental approach: they encrypt the user’s traffic to make it look innocuous, and channel it to a server located outside the censored network. This leads to a fundamental problem: Once the censor discovers the proxy server, the proxy itself becomes just another site to block. If users can find the proxy servers, the censors can too.

In this race to find and use—or find and block—proxy servers, censoring governments enjoy natural, growing advantages over censored users. For example, they can examine all data flowing across their borders in search of disfavored activity. Strategies that rely on friendly servers are failing against increasingly sophisticated state-level censors who can see and control a country’s entire network.

networking takes a different approach.


@Melezh It's problematic that you need big players (ISP or at least big-website) to cooperate. In other words, refraction networking will be hard/impossible to do in a decentralized way.

@Maltimore absolutely. you can't trust the big players. but ultimately if all you need is to circumvent government censorship, I think there will be ISPs in foreign countries (esp. those that are in opposition to %yourgovernment%) who will allow you to access the blocked sites.

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